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Against the Distinction between Intentions for the Future  




How should we account for the planning and performance of a bodily action in terms of 
the agent’s intentions? An influential answer invokes two distinct kinds of intention: 
intentions for the future (also known as prior intentions or distal intentions), responsible 
for action planning, and intentions for the present (also known as intentions in action or 
proximal intentions), responsible for action performance. This article argues that this 
influential answer is wrong, because the notion of intention for the present is either 
superfluous (because intentions for the future can exercise both functions) or confused 
(because it conflates temporal, functional and content-related aspects). Developing this 
critique will lead to an alternative account of action planning and performance based on 




Suppose someone is sitting in an assembly in which a vote is about to be cast by a show 
of hands. They resolve to vote in favour of the proposed motion, and, accordingly, they 
proceed to raise their hand when the appropriate time comes. How is this scenario to be 




The standard response to this question, given by number of theorists (e.g., Searle 
1983; Brand 1984; Bratman 1987; Mele 1992; Pacherie 2006), is that this person should 
be ascribed two distinct token intentions of different kinds. First, upon settling on the 
course of action to vote in favour of the motion, they would form an intention for the 
future representing this course of action. From just before action onset2 onwards, this 
intention will be supplemented by another token intention of a different kind—namely 
an intention for the present—that initiates the action and sustains it until completion. 
According to some versions of the standard response, this intention has a content that is 
more detailed than that of the intention for the future. In the voting scenario mentioned 
at the outset, it would represent, for example, raising one’s hand rather than voting in 
favour of the motion. Theories that provide this standard response will be referred to as 
Dual Theories.  
The first aim of this article is to raise a problem with Dual Theories—
specifically, with the notion of intention for the present. This notion has been widely 
influential, both in philosophy (e.g., O’Shaughnessy 1991; McDowell 2011; Nanay 
2012; Shepherd 2019) and beyond (e.g., Jacob and Jeannerod 2005; Jeannerod 2006; 
Becchio et al. 2012). Yet, I will argue that this notion is either superfluous or confused. 
This first aim dovetails with a second one: introducing what I shall call the Hierarchical 
Theory as an alternative to Dual Theories. I will show how the Hierarchical Theory 
avoids the criticisms that I level against Dual Theories. 
 
2. What are intentions? 
 
Let me start by saying something about intentions of any kind.3 Intentions are mental 




This means that, in order for an intention to be fulfilled, the world should conform to 
what is represented by the intention. This direction of fit does not exhaust the 
characterisation of intentions, because it equally applies to desires to do something: for 
a desire to be fulfilled, the world needs to conform to what is represented by the desire. 
What then distinguishes intention from desire? One influential view is that, differently 
from desiring to do something, intending to do something involves being settled on a 
certain course of action (Bratman 1987; Mele 1992; Holton 2009). For example, unlike 
desiring to catch a specific bus (e.g., bus number 3 at 3:10 p.m.), intending to catch that 
bus involves being committed to this course of action. As a consequence, intending to 
perform actions that are known to be incompatible with catching that bus (e.g., faffing 
around until 3:15 p.m.) leads to a charge of irrationality against the subject. By contrast, 
desiring incompatible courses of action does not.  
To be more precise, according to Bratman (1987), any of a subject’s intentions 
should satisfy the strong consistency requirement. This is the requirement of 
consistency with the rest of the subject’s intentions and beliefs. When a subject breaks 
the strong consistency requirement, for example by knowingly holding inconsistent 
intentions, then that subject is guilty of irrationality.  
 
3. Dual Theories in broad outline 
 
I shall now present the central idea of Dual Theories of intention. Consider t1, the 
timespan running from settling on a certain course of action up to just before action 
onset, and t2, the timespan running from just before action onset to action’s end. 
According to Dual Theories, different kinds of intention should be held at t1 and at t2. I 




been called prior intentions (Searle 1983), prospective intentions (Brand 1984), future-
directed intentions (Bratman 1987), distal intentions (Mele 1992; Pacherie 2008; 
Mylopoulos and Pacherie 2017)—and to those held at t2 as intentions for the present—
versions of which have been called intentions in action (Searle 1983), immediate 
intentions (Brand 1984), present-directed intentions (Bratman 1987), proximal 
intentions (Mele 1992; Pacherie 2008; Mylopoulos and Pacherie 2017).4 The central 
idea shared across most Dual Theories is that two different functions are exercised by 
intentions for the future and intentions for the present. Specifically, intentions for the 
future have functions concerned with planning an action, whereas intentions for the 
present have functions concerned with the execution of an action. Let us call such 
functions planning and executive functions (following Mele 1992 and Pacherie 2006), 
respectively.  
 In what do planning functions consist? This is best answered by reference to 
Michael Bratman (1987), who proposed that the role of intentions in a subject’s 
cognitive economy is to enable effective planning. In line with this idea, his view is that 
intentions (i) end deliberation, (ii) produce further intentions by way of means-end 
reasoning, and (iii) support coordination (both with the rest of one’s plans and with 
those of other individuals). Intentions end deliberation in the sense that one forms or 
acquires an intention once she has settled on a certain course of action, and having an 
intention representing that course of action prevents reconsideration of it. This does not 
hold for information that one did not possess at the time of deliberation: if, once the 
subject in our opening example has formed the intention to vote ‘yes’ in a few minutes, 
they suddenly hear that the building is on fire, they may well give up this intention in 




The characteristics of intentions for the future according to Bratman are 
explicitly endorsed by Mele (1992), Pacherie (2008), Mylopoulos and Pacherie (2017). 
While not mentioning these specific characteristics, Searle (1983) does acknowledge 
that his version of intentions for the future (prior intentions) have a role in planning, 
which is carried out before action performance.  
So much about planning functions. What about executive functions? These are 
functions concerned with the execution of an action—hence their name (Mele 1992; cf. 
Shepherd 2015). They consist in representing a certain course of action, and moving the 
subject to bring about that course of action, on the basis of how it is represented.5 
Mental states exercising executive functions are thus not only representational (Mele 
1992) or cognitive (Brand 1984), but also executive (Mele 1992) or conative (Brand 
1984). To be more specific, moving a subject to bring about a certain course of action 
consists in triggering that course of action and sustaining it until completion. 
I have now presented the main motivation for distinguishing intentions for the 
future from intentions for the present as two different kinds of intention. In the 
following section, I will show that, working on the assumption of a difference in 
function only, the notion of intention for the present superfluous.  
 
4. Some notions of intention for the present are superfluous 
 
I will demonstrate that the notion of intention for the present is superfluous by 
considering two varieties of Dual Theories in turn: those according to which intentions 
for the future and intentions for the present have the same content (section 4.1), and 





4.1 First variety: intentions for the future and intentions for the present have 
the same content 
The most prominent version of a Dual Theory according to which intentions for the 
future and intentions for the present have the same content is Al Mele’s (1992). His 
version of intentions for the present are proximal intentions—so called because of their 
temporal closeness to action onset. Proximal intentions exercise executive functions in 
the following way: whenever the appropriate time for acting comes, a proximal 
intention triggers the relevant actional mechanisms—a term borrowed from Alston 
(1974) that stands for whatever in the brain’s motor system is responsible for the 
production of bodily movements (Mele 1992, pp. 180-181)—and sustains them until 
action completion. Assuming that a subject already has an intention for the future, 
Mele’s version of the corresponding intention for the present inherits its content from 
the intention for the future, moves the subject to perform the action according to how 
the latter is represented in the content, and sustains that action until completion. 
Working on these assumptions, I am now going to challenge that two token intentions 
of different kinds are needed to account for this kind of scenario. 
My argument is going to be based on a general feature of propositional attitudes: 
these can acquire motivational force as a function of time, assuming that their subject is 
capable of keeping track of time (see Evans 1982). For example, suppose one forms an 
intention expressed by the sentence S1: “I intend to raise my arm in 10 minutes.” After 
10 minutes, one shall have realised that the time for acting has come, and the same 
token intention as the one expressed by the sentence S1 will now be expressed by S2: “I 
intend to raise my arm now.”6 This change in expression reflects a change in the 
motivational force of the intention. In virtue of the subject’s realising that 10 minutes 




to initiate an action (for example, by activating the relevant actional mechanisms—it 
being a further question how exactly this happens). The same principle accounts for this 
very intention sustaining the action until completion—for example, until the subject 
realises that the meeting is over. This does not require positing an additional token, let 
alone an additional kind, of intention (see McDowell 2011 for a similar line of 
reasoning).7  
This conclusion makes all the more sense if one considers an analogy between 
intentions on the one hand and combinations of beliefs and desires on the other hand. 
Some combinations of beliefs and desires have different functions at different times: for 
instance, a belief that one has an appointment at 3 p.m. combined with the desire to go 
to that appointment provide one with the motivation to go to the appointment once the 
relevant time comes. Yet, no additional kind of desire—say, executive desire or desire 
in action—is ever posited to take care of the additional motivating function that this 
desire has, combined with the belief that one has an appointment at 3 p.m., from the 
relevant time onwards (see Sinhababu 2013). 
Now, bearing the previous reflections in mind, of course we are free to 
subdivide a single token intention into its temporal components, which we may then call 
intention for the future and intention for the present. But it is unclear what explanatory 
gain we could obtain from this particular distinction, and thus why we should consider 
the intention for the future and the intention for the present as being of different kinds, 
rather than, simply, different temporal segments of the same token intention. 
Let me take stock. In this section, I have worked on the assumption that 
intentions for the future and intentions for the present have the same content and 
different functions—in particular, intentions for the future exercise planning functions 




from just before action onset until action completion. I have argued that this may be 
accounted for by just one token intention, which, just by virtue of its persistence in time, 
is apt to exercise executive functions in addition to planning functions. Therefore, the 
notion of intention for the present is superfluous. 
 
4.2 Second variety: intentions for the future and intentions for the present have 
different contents 
At this point, one may suspect that, perhaps, the notion of intention for the present is 
only superfluous if we assume, as we did in the previous section, that this intention has 
the same content as an intention for the future. What if we work on a different 
assumption, namely that intentions for the future and intentions for the present have 
different contents? Specifically, what if we assume that an intention for the present has 
a more detailed content than an intention for the future (Searle 1983; Brand 1984; 
Pacherie 2006; Mylopoulos and Pacherie 2017)? Does it then become more plausible 
that we should distinguish two kinds of intentions on functional grounds? I will show 
that, even in this case, the notion of intention for the present is superfluous. 
The first step of my argument will be to establish that intentions for the future, 
unless revoked or abandoned by a subject, last until action completion. The result of this 
first step will be that intentions for the future overlap with intentions for the present 
between just before action onset and action completion.  
O’Shaughnessy (1991) provides an instructive example to this effect: suppose 
that on Monday I decide to swim the English Channel at 6 a.m. on Tuesday. I thus form 
an intention for the future that lasts at least until that time. What then? Does this 
intention suddenly expire? O’Shaughnessy rightly suggests that it does not expire until I 




For, “[d]elete the intention at any point and the act fizzles out […]” (O’Shaughnessy 
1991, pp. 273-274; see also Mele 1992; Pacherie 2008). In other words, without that 
intention I would no longer have the motivation to keep swimming, and would thereby 
put an end to my action—for instance, “join my friends in the boat” (O’Shaughnessy 
1991, p. 274). Therefore, the intention for the future to swim the Channel must persist 
until action’s end. If an intention for the present with a more specific content is formed 
closer to action initiation, then the two token intentions will both persist until action’s 
end. 
At this point, one may wonder whether the idea that the persisting intention to 
swim the Channel is a different token intention from the intention for the present is 
right. I suggest that it is, because a subject’s intention representing a given state of 
affairs reflects what that subject is committed to, and a subject might be simultaneously 
committed to different states of affairs. For example, suppose someone has an intention 
with a given content—say, to go to a concert. Suppose, further, that they settle on 
specific means for achieving that end—say, going by horse-drawn carriage. In most 
situations, that one settles on specific means to achieve an end (e.g., going by horse-
drawn carriage) does not make it any less true that one also intends to bring about that 
end (going to the concert), regardless of the means one ends up settling upon. That is, 
one is committed to bringing about both states of affairs—the end regardless of the 
means, as well as the specific chosen means. But contrast the scenario just considered 
with one in which someone intends to go to a concert by horse-drawn carriage, and in 
no other way. This case is captured by the subject’s having the intention to go to the 
concert by horse-drawn carriage, but not by their having both the intention to go to the 
concert by horse-drawn carriage and the intention to go to the concert, because they are 




carriage, you shouldn’t even bother to turn up!”). The idea that the intention to go to the 
concert is a different token intention from that to go to the concert by horse-drawn 
carriage enables us to distinguish the commitments of the accommodating subject in the 
first scenario from those of the fastidious subject in the second scenario. 
If we want to do justice to these differential commitments—as we should—we 
can conclude that intentions for the future, unless revoked by the subject, last until 
action completion, alongside intentions for the present (see also Searle 1991 in response 
to O’Shaughnessy 1991; Mele 1992; Pacherie 2008).  
At this point, it has been established that intentions for the future and intentions 
for the present both last until action completion (unless either is revoked). Working on 
this assumption, can a distinction between intentions for the future and intentions for the 
present be retained on functional grounds? I will argue for a negative answer, by 
showing that each intention has both kinds of function.  
Let me start with intentions for the future. So far, I have shown that they last 
until action completion. In the previous section, I showed that, if an intention lasts until 
action completion, then it will have executive functions from just before action onset 
onwards—assuming that its subject is capable of keeping track of time. My interim 
conclusion is therefore that intentions for the future, besides planning functions, also 
have executive functions. 
Conversely, it can be shown that intentions for the present also have planning 
functions—i.e. ending deliberation, generating new intentions by means-end reasoning 
and supporting coordination. Consider the intention for the present to swim with the 
breaststroke technique. Here is how it may end deliberation even while the action is 
being performed. Recall from section 3 that deliberation is ended relative to a certain 




re-opened. The unfolding of an action is precisely the sort of circumstance that could 
potentially provide a subject with new information—for example, by starting to swim 
with the breaststroke technique, I may realise that I am getting tired much earlier than I 
expected. This new piece of information might lead me to re-open deliberation. Notice 
that any point during the crossing may provide me with new pieces of information, so 
that at any point I may in principle re-open deliberation. Therefore, at any point after 
action onset an intention for the present has the potential of ending 
deliberation. Moreover, the intention for the present may also generate new token 
intentions via means-end reasoning (e.g., the intention to move one’s arms in a certain 
way), and support coordination by suitably constraining the content of any newly 
formed intention. In other words, intentions for the present, too, have planning functions 
in addition to executive functions. This is in line with the idea that, as has been 
independently observed by Bratman (1987), Pacherie (2008) and Shepherd (2015), the 
exercise of planning functions is not over once the action has started.  
So, working on the assumption that intentions for the future and intentions for 
the present differ in content, the idea that they should be differentiated on the grounds 
that they have different functions does not stand up to scrutiny: I have shown that 
intentions for the future have executive functions alongside planning functions, and that 
intentions for the present have planning functions alongside executive functions.8 So, 
even in this case, the notion of intention for the present is superfluous. 
 
5. Some notions of intention for the present are confused 
 
I have just reviewed a main motivation for distinguishing intentions for the future from 




difference in function, the notion of intention for the present is superfluous. Now I shall 
review two additional main motivations for distinguishing between intentions for the 
future and intentions for the present. The first, which I will discuss in section 5.1, is that 
closeness to action onset, when intentions for the present are formed, makes it the case 
that the content of intentions for the present is more specific than that of intentions for 
the future. The second, which I will discuss in section 5.2, is that the exercise of 
executive functions requires intentions for the present to have a certain kind of content. 
I shall argue that both ideas are mistaken, and lead to a confused notion of intention for 
the present—confused insofar as it conflates temporal, functional and content-related 
aspects. 
 
5.1 Does proximity to action onset require a more detailed content?  
Some Dual Theories have it that intentions for the future should be differentiated from 
intentions for the present on the grounds that the latter, in virtue of being formed closer 
to action onset, will have a more detailed content than the former. Searle, for example, 
has suggested that  
 
[i]n any real-life situation the [intention for the present] will be much more 
determinate than the [intention for the future], it will include not only that my 
arm goes up but that it goes up in a certain way and at a certain speed, etc. 
(1983, p. 93) 
 
This leads to a conflation between temporal and content-related aspects: 
intentions for the present are characterised both in terms of being formed just before 




intentions for the future (content-related aspect). However, the conflation between 
temporal and content-related aspects should be avoided, because it is based on an 
oversimplification: as has been observed even in the context of some Dual Theories 
(e.g., Pacherie 2006; Mylopoulos and Pacherie 2018), one may represent an action in 
greater detail at any point in time, before or after action onset.9 Thus, a notion of 
intention for the present that treats temporal aspects and content-related aspects of an 
intention as so tightly related is confused. 
The idea that intentions for the present have a more detailed content than 
intentions for the future is also confused because of the following fact. The 
representation of an action in greater detail is not a one-time phenomenon: one can 
represent the action that one is going to perform (or is performing) in greater detail not 
only at any point in time, but also as many times as one wishes. This makes it hard to 
understand which intentions should count as intentions for the present on content-
related grounds, as I will now show. 
Think again of the Channel-swimming example. After beginning to act (i.e., 
after plunging into the Channel), I have multiple chances for forming new intentions. 
For example, I may form the intention to swim around an obstacle. This is an intention 
with a more detailed content than that of swimming the Channel, and, as such, it may be 
considered an intention for the present on content-related grounds. The intention to 
swim around an obstacle, however, may in turn generate the intention to swim around 
the obstacle with the breaststroke technique, which is an intention with an even more 
detailed content than that of swimming around the obstacle. As such, it should be an 
intention for the present. What about the intention to swim around the obstacle, then? 
Should it be an intention for the future, insofar as it has a less detailed content than the 




for the present, insofar as it has a more detailed content than the intention to swim the 
Channel? There is no principled answer to this question: the fact that a subject will 
normally form many new token intentions, and not just one, makes it hard to draw a 
distinction between intentions for the future and intentions for the present based on the 
extent to which their content is detailed. This is an additional reason why a notion of 
intention for the present that conflates temporal and content-related aspects is 
confused.10 
 
5.2 Does the exercise of executive functions require a certain kind of content? 
Another motivation in support of the distinction between two kinds of intention is the 
idea that intentions for the present have to have a content that is very detailed, because 
this is necessary for the performance of executive functions. However, it can be shown 
that it is not.  
Consider the following example. 
  
Wilma, standing at a bus stop, sees a baby leaning out of a fourth-story window 
and feels certain that he will fall. We may suppose that Wilma proximally 
intends to save the baby and that she immediately begins running toward him 
with that intention, though her plan for saving the baby is not yet fully 
determinate. As Wilma runs, the details fall into place […]. But there was a 
time, however brief, during which she was settled upon saving the child without 
yet being settled upon the precise manner in which she would save him. (Mele 





This example shows that an intention held in proximity of action onset or during action 
performance may have a content that is not too detailed (i.e., not specifying the manner 
in which Wilma will save the baby), and yet exercise executive functions—that is, it is 
apt to trigger a certain course of action and sustain it until completion. So, the exercise 
of executive functions does not require that the intention exercising this function should 
have a content that is too detailed. Therefore, a notion of intention for the present that 
conflates the exercise of executive functions with a content that is too detailed is 
confused. 
 An alternative motivation for preserving the distinction between two kinds of 
intention based on a systematic relation between the exercise of executive functions and 
a certain kind of content is the following. The content of intentions for the present has 
to include indexicals concerning objects to be acted on—for example, that rock 
(Pacherie 2006; Mylopoulos and Pacherie 2017)—or pragmatic representations, namely 
representations of specific possibilities for action—for example, a climbable rock 
(Nanay 2013). By contrast, the content of an intention for the future may or may not 
include indexicals or pragmatic representations. The rationale for this is the idea that a 
content that includes indexicals or pragmatic representations is necessary for the 
performance of executive functions. However, again, it can be shown that it is not.  
Consider an alternative example in which Wilma settles on the course of action 
of going shopping for groceries. This is enough to get her to walk and leave the house. 
The details of which route she is going to take, or even of where she will shop for 
groceries, will be settled later, but the intention of going shopping for groceries does 
trigger her action and sustain it until she has completed her errands (unless she changes 
her mind). The intention of going shopping for groceries includes neither object 




course of action.11 There is no straightforward relationship between indexical content or 
content including pragmatic representations on the one hand and the exercise of 
executive functions on the other hand.12 Therefore, a notion of intention for the present 
that conflates these aspects is confused. 
 
6. The Hierarchical Theory: hierarchically ordered intentions of just one kind 
 
I am now going to put forward a theory—the Hierarchical Theory—that aims to do 
justice to the phenomena motivating Dual Theories while not falling prey to the 
aforementioned criticisms.  
Both the Hierarchical Theory and Dual Theories aim to answer the following 
question: how does a subject plan and execute an action? Dual Theories maintain that a 
subject will plan and execute an action by means of different kinds of intention: 
specifically, intentions for the future, which have planning functions, and intentions for 
the present, which have executive functions. On the basis of the results of section 4.1, if 
intentions for the future and intentions for the present are conceived as having the same 
content, they should be integrated into just one kind of intention. Therefore, in the 
Hierarchical Theory, from the temporal point of view some intentions will straddle the 
boundary between before and after action onset. If intentions for the future and 
intentions for the present are conceived as having different contents, on the basis of the 
results of 4.2, they should be replaced by different token intentions of just one kind, 
each having both functions. The Hierarchical Theory incorporates these results, and has 
it that a subject will plan and execute her action by means of intentions of just one kind, 




Another question that some Dual Theories attempt to answer is: how does a 
subject represent her action in greater detail over time? As I mentioned before, many 
Dual Theories (but not all: cf. Bratman 1987; Pacherie 2006; Mylopoulos and Pacherie 
2018) have emphasised the time just before action onset as especially important for the 
formation of intentions with a more detailed content. This, however, is not warranted: as 
discussed in section 5.1, a more detailed representation of an action may take place at 
any point in time, and an action may be represented in greater detail several times.  
Here is where the notion of hierarchy comes into play. Incorporating the results 
of section 5.1, the Hierarchical Theory has it that the process of forming additional 
token intentions with increasingly detailed contents may occur at any point in time, 
rather than just around action onset, and typically more than once. I thus suggest that 
the representation of one’s own action in greater detail is accounted for in terms of 
many different token intentions, which represent an action in different degrees of 
detail.13 
Now, working on the assumption that, at any given point in time, a subject has 
several token intentions representing her action in different degrees of detail, these 
intentions are subject to a natural ordering. Developing an insight by Anscombe (1957), 
I propose that different token intentions may be ordered hierarchically in such a way 
that the intention to a will lie above the intention to b if and only if a can be done by 
b.14 Suppose that one intends to have something to drink. After a moment’s reflection, 
on the basis of this intention, they will form the intention with the more specific content 
to drink champagne. Now, since having something to drink can be fulfilled by drinking 
champagne, the intention to have something to drink and the intention drink champagne 
may be ordered hierarchically so that the former lies above the latter. By the same 




detailed content—for example, the intention to pick up a glass of champagne from a 
tray that is being passed around (see Fig. 1).  
 
Figure 1. Different token intentions may be ordered hierarchically on the 
basis of the following principle: the intention to a lies above the intention to 
b if and only if a can be done by b. 
 
This is why the Hierarchical Theory is so named: it features several token intentions of 
the same kind that are hierarchically ordered on the basis of the criterion just given. 
This hierarchical ordering reflects relationships of motivation and constraint among 
different token intentions. Specifically, token intentions higher up in the hierarchy 
motivate the formation of token intentions lower down in the hierarchy, and 
furthermore impose constraints on which token intentions may be formed lower down 
in the hierarchy (in line with what has also been observed by, for instance, Bratman 
1987; Pacherie 2006; Wu 2011; Shepherd 2015). For example, the intention to have 
something to drink imposes constraints on which intentions are apt to fulfil it: the 
intention to drink champagne is apt to fulfil it (insofar as one may have something to 




 Dual Theories conflate temporal, functional and content-related aspects. The 
Hierarchical Theory separates these features on the grounds that there is no 
straightforward relation between them. For example, according to the Hierarchical 
Theory a given token intention may exercise executive functions simply as long as it 
exists at the right time. Specifically, intentions can trigger an action if they are formed 
just before action onset, or are retained until then, and can sustain an action until 
completion if they are retained until then. The question of whether token intentions 
with any content may exercise executive functions would take me too far afield, and 
will therefore be left for another occasion. The point here is simply that the exercise of 
executive functions is compatible with many different contents, though not necessarily 
with any content. In particular, the exercise of these functions does not require a content 
that is very detailed, or that includes object indexicals or pragmatic representations. 
Moreover, temporal vicinity to action onset and exercise of executive functions 
are unrelated to the degree of content specificity of an intention: many different token 
intentions may be held from just before action onset and exercise executive functions, 
regardless of the degree of detail of their content, as was shown in section 5.2. 
Conversely, intentions held well in advance of action onset may, for example, include 
indexicals: I intend to drink that cup of tea sitting on the table in front of me as soon as I 
am finished editing this article, which may take another while. The Hierarchical Theory, 
in sum, explicitly separates the temporal profile of intentions from their content-related 
one.  
The temporal profile of an intention is determined by when intentions are 
formed and how long they are retained. The content-related profile of an intention is 
determined by the state of affairs represented by that intention, and illustrated by the 




have a less detailed content than intentions lower down in the hierarchy. Herein lies 
another difference with respect to Dual Theories: the latter are hardly ever explicit 
about a criterion on the basis of which different token intentions should be 
distinguished. By contrast, the Hierarchical Theory is explicitly committed to the idea 




I have examined the influential proposal that an account of planning and executing 
bodily actions requires positing two different kinds of intention—intentions for the 
future and intentions for the present. I have reviewed the main motivations provided by 
the theories supporting this proposal, which I referred to as Dual Theories, and 
concluded that they fail to support this distinction.  
I have put forward an alternative to Dual Theories, in the form of the 
Hierarchical Theory. I have shown that the Hierarchical Theory does justice to the 
phenomena that motivate Dual Theories while not falling prey to the criticisms that 
apply to different notions of intention for the present.  
This article has provided some clarifications about the distinctive contributions 
of intentions to bodily action planning and execution—specifically, concerning the 
functional role of intentions and the individuation of token intentions on the basis of 
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John Campbell, Dan Cavedon-Taylor, Tom Crowther, Juan-Camilo Espejo-Serna, 
Mirko Farina, Pete Fossey, Ellen Fridland, Thor Grünbaum, Falk Hamann, Anandi 
Hattiangadi, Gregor Hochstetter, Angelica Kaufmann, Harold Langsam, Caleb Liang, 
Roberta Locatelli, Guy Longworth, Tom McClelland, Kourken Michaelian, Christoph 
Michel, Alex Morgan, Myrto Mylopoulos, Bence Nanay, Krisztina Orbán, Elisabeth 
Pacherie, Mattia Riccardi, Hans Roth, Katia Samoilova, Josh Shepherd, Neil Sinhababu, 
Corrado Sinigaglia, Nicola Spinelli, James Stazicker, Margot Strohminger, Charles 
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2 I will use the shorthand just before action onset to mean sufficiently in advance as to 
be able to cause the action (see Mele 1992). 
3 The assumptions that I am about to report are shared within many standard causal 
theories of action. 
4 According to some Dual Theories, intentions for the future are held at t1 only (e.g., 
Searle 1983; Mele 1992). According to others, intentions for the future are held at both 
t1 and at t2 (see section 4.2; O’Shaughnessy 1991; Searle 1991; Pacherie 2008). Either 
way, a temporal difference holds between intentions for the future and intentions for the 
present insofar as the latter are held only at t2.  
5 These are not to be confused with the notion of executive function in psychology. The 
latter is an umbrella term for a number of cognitive processes—including inhibitory 
control, working memory and attentional flexibility—that are involved in the control of 
actions (Gilbert and Burgess 2008). I am thankful to Wayne Christensen for pointing 
this out. 
6 One may think that S1 and S2 express different intentions. I object to this, based on the 
idea that S1 and S2 are merely different formulations of one’s indexical thoughts as time 
passes (Dokic 1996: 180, referring to Kaplan 1989). In the same line of thought, 
according to Frege (1918/1984), the thought expressed on Monday by the sentence 
“Today is a beautiful day” can be expressed by the sentence “Yesterday was a beautiful 
day” the day after (Dokic 1996). 
7 Mele considers the possibility that intentions for the future might evolve into 
intentions for the present (1992, pp. 167, 179-180). This is not the same as what I am 





and intentions for the present being two token intentions of different kinds. I am 
grateful to Steve Butterfill for useful discussion on this point. 
8 An anonymous reviewer raises the following questions: what role does the difference 
in content between the two token intentions have in this argument? In particular, 
couldn’t it be that, because the two token intentions considered in this example have 
different contents, they could consequently have different functions? The latter idea can 
be excluded on the following grounds. As mentioned in section 3, it is part of the 
definition of executive functions that these are exercised relative to the way the action is 
represented—whether, for example, as walking North, or as walking towards Euston 
Station—i.e. relative to a specific content of the corresponding intention. Intentions 
with different contents may therefore be all said to exercise executive functions, and to 
be equal in this respect. An analogous line of reasoning can be provided as far as 
planning functions are concerned: the fact that two token intentions have different 
contents simply means that their planning functions will be exercised relative to 
different contents—for example, the two token intentions will generate different token 
intentions via means-end reasoning. Here is an illustration: the intention to keep 
walking North will generate the intention to walk in the direction indicated by the 
Northern Star, whereas the intention to walk towards Euston Station will generate the 
intention to look for Euston Station on one’s map. But this is consistent with saying that 
both token intentions—that to keep walking North and to walk towards Euston 
Station—have the same function, insofar as both have planning functions. The role of 
the difference in content between two token intentions in this argument is to show that, 
even hypothesising that two token intentions have different contents will not lead to the 





shown to have planning and executive functions. An alternative way to raise an 
objection would be to deny that an intention for the future can acquire executive 
functions simply as a function of time, unless this intention has a content that is very 
detailed. This idea will be tackled in section 5.2. I am grateful to this anonymous 
reviewer for inviting me to clarify these important points. 
9 Another reason why the conflation should be avoided is that, whenever the notion of 
intention for the present is employed, it is often not clear whether it is meant to indicate 
an intention formed in proximity to action onset, or an intention with a very specific 
content, or both. 
10 I am grateful to Sandro Zucchi for useful discussion on this point. 
11 It may be objected that the content of Wilma’s intention to go shopping for groceries, 
in order to be effective, does need to contain an indexical, namely now. This, however, 
is not an indexical concerning objects, but, rather, time. In section 4.1 I showed that 
time indexicals do not license positing different token intentions, let alone intentions of 
a different kind. I am grateful to James Stazicker for useful discussion on this point. 
12 I am grateful to Wayne Christensen for helping me put this point into focus. 
13 An anonymous reviewer wonders why hold this view as opposed to one in which the 
process of forming more detailed takes place by filling in the content of an already 
existing intention. The reason has to do with the reflections introduced in section 4.2: 
introducing new token intentions rather than filling in the content of an already existing 
intention enables us to do justice to the commitments that different subjects may have to 
different states of affairs. 
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